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CHAPTER 2 
Workers' Freedom of Association 
in the United States 
The Gap between Ideals and Practice 
Lance Compa 
Workers' Freedom of Association under 
International Human Rights Law 
The International Background 
I nternational human rights analysts and advocates have been slow com-ing to grips with issues of workers' rights. Attention has focused on 
pressing problems of arbitrary detention and torture, massacres of in-
digenous peoples and ethnic minorities, atrocities of war and civil war, 
and other gross human rights violations, not on workers' rights to form 
and join trade unions and bargain collectively. For their part, worker 
representatives have been slow to see human rights aspects in their work. 
The day-to-day challenge of organizing and bargaining in complex 
frameworks of national labor laws leaves little time to learn from inter-
national human rights discourse. In the United States and in many other 
countries, union and management officials and attorneys, as well as ad-
ministrators and judges, seldom turn to international law to inform 
their work. 
All that is changing under the pressures of a globalizing economy and 
new sensitivity to the human rights implications of workers' rights ad-
vocacy. For example, employers' organizations, trade unions, and gov-
ernments joined together at the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in 1998 to issue a landmark Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work. Their common declaration set out freedom 
of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively as the 
first such principles. 
At the same time, the 1998 action at the ILO was not a complete nov-
elty. Freedom of association for workers has long been universally 
acknowledged as a fundamental right. A widely accepted body of inter-
national norms has established standards for workers' freedom of asso-
23 
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ciation covering the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, 
and the right to strike.1 
Sources of international labor law on workers' freedom of association 
include human rights instruments developed by the United Nations and 
by regional human rights bodies, principles elaborated through worker, 
employer, and government representatives at the ILO, and labor rights 
clauses in international trade agreements. The United States has ac-
knowledged its international responsibility to honor workers' freedom 
of association by ratifying human rights instruments, in particular the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It has also ac-
cepted obligations under ILO conventions on freedom of association 
and under the 1998 declaration. 
The United States has committed itself, through international agree-
ment, to effectively enforce U.S. laws protecting workers' rights to or-
ganize, bargain collectively, and strike. It has affirmed obligations to 
honor workers' freedom of association in its own trade laws and in laws 
governing U.S. involvement in the World Bank, the International Mon-
etary Fund, and other multilateral bodies. In all these laws, freedom of 
association is held out as the foremost internationally recognized work-
ers' right. 
International Human Rights Instruments 
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states 
that "everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association," and "everyone has the right to form and to join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests."2 
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR, 1966) declares: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests."3 
• The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR, 1966) obliges governments to "ensure the right of 
everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice 
. . . the right of trade unions to function freely. . . the right to strike."4 
The United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights in 1992. The ICCPR requires ratifying states "to respect 
Workers' Freedom of Association in the United States 25 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its ju-
risdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant" and "to adopt 
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant." The ICCPR also con-
strains ratifying states "to ensure that any person whose rights or free-
doms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy."5 
When the U.S. Senate ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights in 1992, it took several reservations, understand-
ings, and declarations sidestepping certain obligations in the covenant, 
perhaps most notably reserving the right to impose capital punishment 
on minors.6 But it took no reservations, understandings, or declarations 
with respect to Article 22 on the right to form and join trade unions, or 
to Article 2 requiring an "effective remedy" for rights violations.7 
Acknowledging the obligation, the U.S. State Department's first re-
port on compliance with the ICCPR stated that "provisions of the First, 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee freedom of assembly in 
all contexts, including the right of workers to establish and join organi-
zations of their own choosing. . . . The rights of association and or-
ganization are supplemented by legislation."8 Distressingly, however, 
the United States devalued the importance of protecting the right to 
freedom of association by claiming that the widespread exclusion of 
workers from coverage under U.S. labor laws—primarily agricultural 
workers, domestic workers, and supervisory employees—"means only 
that they do not have access to the specific provisions of the NLRA . . . 
for enforcing their rights to organize and bargain collectively."9 "Only" 
lacking access to enforcement mechanisms means these workers' rights 
can be violated with impunity. There is no labor board or other au-
thority to remedy violations. 
Regional Instruments 
Regional human rights instruments reaffirm the consensus on workers' 
freedom of association as a basic right: 
• The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(1948) states: "Every person has the right to assemble peaceably with 
others in a formal public meeting or an informal gathering, in 
connection with matters of common interest of any nature. Every 
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person has the right to associate with others to promote, exercise and 
protect his legitimate interests of a political, economic, religious, social, 
cultural, professional, labor union or other nature."10 
• The later American Convention on Human Rights (1969) 
declares: "Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, 
religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other 
purposes."11 
• Reflecting the international consensus on workers' freedom of 
association, though it does not involve the United States, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950) says: "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right 
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests."12 
• The European Unions Community Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers (1989) holds: "Employers and workers of the 
European Community shall have the right of association in order to 
constitute professional organisations or trade unions of their choice for 
the defence of their economic and social interests . . . the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements under the conditions laid 
down by national legislation and practice . . . the right to strike, subject 
to the obligations arising under national regulations and collective 
agreements.13 
ILO Conventions and OECD Guidelines 
Building on this international consensus, the ILO, a UN-related body 
with nearly universal membership and tripartite representation by gov-
ernments, workers, and employers, recognizes freedom of association 
and protection of the right to organize as core workers' rights. Over 
decades of painstaking treatment of allegations of violations of workers' 
rights, the ILO s Committee on Freedom of Association has elaborated 
authoritative guidelines for implementation of the right to organize, the 
right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike. 
• ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association and protection 
of the right to organize says that "workers and employers, without 
distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject 
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only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations of 
their own choosing without previous authorization."14 
• ILO Convention 98 declares that "workers shall enjoy adequate 
protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their 
employment. . . . Such protection shall apply more particularly in 
respect of acts calculated to—a) make the employment of a worker 
subject to the condition that he shall not join a union or shall 
relinquish union membership; b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise 
prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or because of 
participation in union activities." 
In greater detail, Convention 98 goes on to say: 
"Workers' and employers' organizations shall enjoy adequate protec-
tion against any acts of interference by each other. . . . Machinery ap-
propriate to national conditions shall be established, where necessary, 
for the purpose of ensuring respect for the right to organize . . . . Mea-
sures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where neces-
sary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of 
machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers' and workers' 
organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective agreements."15 
'Ss-
elated body 
ion by gov-
association 
ights. Over 
ofworkers' 
> elaborated 
rganize, the 
Lection 
thout 
subject 
i? 
• The ILO's Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
says expressly: "All members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions 
in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in 
the Organization, to respect, to promote, and to realize, in good faith and 
in accordance with the [ILO] Constitution, the principles concerning the 
fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining." 
ILO core conventions were officially recognized at the 1995 World 
Social Summit conference in Copenhagen. In addition to those cover-
ing freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, ILO norms on forced labor, child labor, and employment 
discrimination were defined as essential to ensuring human rights in the 
workplace. Signed by the United States, the Copenhagen summits fi-
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nal declaration called on governments to ratify these ILO conventions, 
to respect them even if they have not ratified them, and to use interna-
tional labor standards as a benchmark for their national legislation.16 
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights includes these ILO 
conventions in an authoritative list of "international human rights in-
struments."17 
At the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the United States subscribes to a statement that "enterprises 
should, within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing labor 
relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in which 
they operate: respect the right of their employees to be represented by 
trade unions . . . and engage in constructive negotiations . . . with such 
employee organizations with a view to reaching agreements on employ-
ment conditions."18 The OECD has characterized freedom of associa-
tion and the right to organize and bargain collectively as labor standards 
that "reflect basic human rights which should be observed in all coun-
tries, independently of their levels of economic development and socio-
cultural traditions."19 
U.S. Commitments in the Multilateral Setting 
The United States championed the 1998 adoption of the ILOs Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work that set out free-
dom of association as the first such principle and right. On adoption, 
U.S. labor secretary Alexis Herman declared, "The ILO has underlined 
and clarified the importance of the fundamental rights of workers in an 
era of economic globalization . . . ILO members have accepted the need 
to be accountable, and with this action there will now be a process 
within the ILO to demonstrate that accountability."20 
Whether or not a country has ratified conventions 87 and 98, the 
ILO has determined that ILO member countries are "bound to respect 
a certain number of general rules which have been established for the 
common good . . . among these principles, freedom of association has 
become a customary rule above the Conventions."21 Though it has so 
far not ratified conventions 87 and 98, the United States has accepted 
jurisdiction and review by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Associ-
ation (CFA) of complaints filed against it under these conventions. 
Several ILO cases involving the United States in the past fifteen years 
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have challenged its compliance with international labor standards. The 
United States has defended itself in these cases by describing its elabo-
rate system of labor laws and procedures and asserting that the system 
generally conforms to ILO standards.22 In many cases, the CFA "noted 
with concern" and "drew the attention of the U.S. government" to prob-
lems the committee perceived. In some cases, the committee recom-
mended changes in policy and practice. However, the ILO has no 
enforcement powers, and the United States took no action to imple-
ment the recommendations. 
Reporting on compliance and defending against complaints, the 
United States likewise has taken the position that its labor law and prac-
tice are generally in conformance with the conventions but that some 
elements of U.S. federal and state labor laws conflicted with the con-
ventions' detailed requirements. Ratification of ILO conventions would 
amount to "back door" amendments to U.S. labor laws without fol-
lowing the normal legislative process because the ratification of an in-
ternational treaty would supersede preexisting domestic law under the 
United States' constitutional system.23 The leading U.S. employer rep-
resentative to the ILO cautioned against making U.S. law subject to 
ILO supervision because "this machinery is not in our control" and the 
United States could be embarrassed by holding "our domestic laws and 
practices up to greater international scrutiny and criticism than is 
presently the case."24 
Before 1999, U.S. reports to the ILO on compliance with freedom 
of association standards offered boilerplate descriptions of American 
labor law and asserted that U.S. law and practice "appears to be in gen-
eral conformance" with conventions 87 and 98.2 5 Significantly, how-
ever, the United States in a 1999 report acknowledged for the first time 
that "there are aspects of this [U.S. labor law] system that fail to fully 
protect the rights to organize and bargain collectively of all employees 
in all circumstances." 
The 1999 U.S. report stated that "the United States is concerned 
about these limitations and acknowledges that to ensure respect, pro-
motion and realization of the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
it is important to reexamine any system of labor laws from time to time 
to assure that the system continues to protect these fundamental 
rights."26 An ILO Committee of Expert-Advisors that reviewed coun-
try reports called the U.S. statements "striking for their open recogni-
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tion of difficulties still to be overcome or situations they deemed rele-
vant to achieving full respect for the principles and rights in the Decla-
''27 
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U.S. Trade Laws 
The United States has also affirmed the importance of international 
norms and obligations regarding workers' freedom of association in its 
own trade statutes. Although these laws create obligations for trading 
partners, they underscore the U.S. commitment to freedom of associa-
tion under international standards. In these statutes governing trade 
relationships with other countries, Congress defined freedom of associ-
ation and the right to organize and bargain collectively as "internation-
ally recognized workers' rights."28 
Labor rights amendments have been added to statutes governing the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1984,29 the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation in 1985,30 the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
in 1986,31 section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988,32 Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) funding for economic development grants 
overseas,33 and U.S. participation in the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and other international lending agencies.34 All these 
measures hold out the possibility of economic sanctions against trading 
partners that violate workers' rights. In every case, freedom of associa-
tion and the right to organize and bargain collectively are the first rights 
listed. 
In formulating the labor rights clauses in U.S. trade laws, Congress 
has relied on ILO guidance. In its report on legislation governing U.S. 
participation in international financial institutions, Congress pointed 
to "the relevant conventions of the International Labour Organization, 
which have set forth, among other things, the rights of association [and] 
the right to organize and bargain collectively."35 Analyzing the applica-
tion of workers' rights provisions in U.S. trade laws, the General Ac-
counting Office underscored the fact that "the international standards 
have been set by the International Labour Organization, which is part 
of the U.N. structure."36 
Since passage of the 1984 GSP labor rights amendment, the U.S. 
State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
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refer to ILO Convention 87 as the basis of U.S. policy on workers' free-
dom of association. The reports say that "the 'right of association' has 
been defined by the International Labour Organization to include the 
right of workers to establish and to join organizations of their own 
choosing," and "the right to organize and bargain collectively includes 
the right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and 
settlement of disputes with employers; the right to protection against 
interference; and the right to protection against acts of antiunion dis-
crimination."37 
Regarding strikes, the State Department's human rights policy is that 
"the right of association includes the right of workers to strike. While 
strikes may be restricted in essential services (i.e., those services the in-
terruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health 
of a significant portion of the population) and in the public sector, these 
restrictions must be offset by adequate guarantees to safeguard the in-
terests of the workers concerned."38 The State Department's formula-
tion of the right to strike reflects the determination by the ILO that the 
right to strike is an essential element of the right to freedom of associa-
tion. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico brought with it a labor side 
agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC). Freedom of association and protection of the right to orga-
nize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike are the first 
three "labor principles" of the NAALC. This international agreement 
was negotiated at the insistence of the United States government fol-
lowing a commitment made during President Clintons 1992 electoral 
campaign.39 
The NAALC characterizes the first labor principle as "the right of 
workers exercised freely and without impediment to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing to further and defend their inter-
ests." The agreement formulates the right to bargain collectively as "the 
protection of the right of organized workers to freely engage in collec-
tive bargaining on matters concerning the terms and conditions of em-
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ployment." It describes the right to strike as "the protection of the right 
of workers to strike in order to defend their collective interests."40 With 
its North American trading partners, the United States committed it-
self to promote the NAALC labor principles and to "effectively enforce 
its labor law" to achieve their realization.41 
U.S. Labor Law and International Norms— 
Violations and Case Studies 
American workers secured the right to organize, to bargain collectively, 
and to strike with passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
of 1935. The NLRA declares a national policy of "full freedom of asso-
ciation" and protects workers' "right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
"42 
tion. * z 
The NLRA makes it unlawful for employers to "interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce" workers in the exercise of these rights. It creates the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce the law by inves-
tigating and remedying violations. All these measures comport with 
international human rights norms regarding workers' freedom of asso-
ciation. 
However, some provisions of U.S. law openly conflict with interna-
tional standards on freedom of association. Millions of workers, in-
cluding farm workers, household domestic workers, and low-level 
supervisors are expressly barred from the law's protection of the right to 
organize. United States law allows employers to permanently replace 
workers who exercise the right to strike, effectively nullifying the right. 
New forms of employment relationships have created millions of part-
time, temporary, subcontracted, and otherwise "atypical" or "contin-
gent" workers whose freedom of association is frustrated by the law's 
failure to adapt to changes in the economy. 
The reality of U.S. labor law enforcement falls far short of its goals. 
Many workers who try to form trade unions are spied on, harassed, pres-
sured, threatened, suspended, fired, deported, or otherwise victimized 
in reprisal for their exercise of the right to freedom of association. 
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A culture of near-impunity has taken shape in much of U.S. labor law 
and practice. Any employer intent on resisting workers' self-organiza-
tion can drag out legal proceedings for years, fearing litde more than an 
order to post a written notice in the workplace promising not to repeat 
unlawful conduct. Many employers have come to view remedies like 
back pay for workers fired because of union activity as a routine cost of 
doing business, well worth it to get rid of organizing leaders and derail 
workers' organizing efforts. 
Private employers are the main agents of abuse. But international hu-
man rights law makes governments responsible for protecting vulnera-
ble persons and groups from patterns of abuse by private actors. The 
United States is failing to meet this responsibility. As noted above, many 
groups of workers are unprotected by the law. And even when the law 
is applied for workers who come under its coverage, enervating delays 
and weak remedies invite continued violations. 
Patterns of violations exemplified in the case studies that follow are 
not exceptional and the accelerating pace of violations is not a new 
phenomenon. Congressional hearings in the 1970s and 1980s revealed 
extensive employer violations and ineffective enforcement of laws sup-
posed to protect workers' rights. Other government studies and reports 
from independent commissions in the 1980s and 1990s reached simi-
lar conclusions.43 But those research efforts did not analyze violations 
in light of international human rights standards, which is the goal of 
this study. 
Discrimination against Union Supporters 
Firing or otherwise discriminating against a worker for trying to form a 
union is illegal but commonplace in the United States. In the 1950s, 
workers who suffered reprisals for exercising the right to freedom of as-
sociation numbered in the hundreds each year. In the 1960s, the num-
ber climbed into the thousands, reaching slighdy more than 6,000 in 
1969. By the 1990s more than 20,000 workers each year were victims 
of discrimination for union activity—23,580 in 1998, the most recent 
year for which figures are available.44 
An employer determined to get rid of a union activist knows that all 
that awaits, after years of litigation if the employer persists in appeals, is 
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a reinstatement order the worker is likely to decline and a modest back-
pay award. For many employers, it is a small price to pay to destroy a 
workers' organizing effort by firing its leaders. 
Case Study: A Nursing Home in Southern Florida 
Workers at the King David Center in West Palm Beach voted 48-29 in 
favor of union representation in an NLRB election in August 1994. "I 
had a determination to get respect," said Jean Aliza, the first of several 
workers fired for organizing activity at King David. "I am a citizen, and 
I deserve respect."45 
According to the administrative law judge's decision in the case, King 
David management proceeded systematically to fire the most active 
union supporters.46 Jean Aliza, Lude Duval, Marie Larose, Marie Pierre 
Louis, Michelle Williams, Carline Dorisca, and Ernest Duval were all 
fired on fabricated charges. They were ordered reinstated by the ad-
ministrative law judge who heard testimony and reviewed documents, 
and the NLRB upheld the judge's order. In 1999 the workers were still 
not reinstated because of appeals to the courts. No collective agreement 
has been reached. 
Jean Aliza was "set up" by managers and fired early in the organizing 
effort, after a yearlong "satisfactory" record suddenly became "unsatis-
factory" based on warning notices he never saw.47 King David "was de-
termined to rid itself of the most vocal union supporter from the 
beginning," said the administrative law judges ruling, referring to 
Ernest Duval.48 
Ernest Duval was still vocal about his union support when he spoke 
in July 1999, but he was also frustrated. "I see the government protect-
ing management," he said. "It's been four or five years now, and I've got 
bills to pay. Management has the time to do whatever they want."49 
Forced Attendance at Captive-Audience 
Meetings 
Almost without limits, employers can force workers to attend captive-
I audience meetings on work time. Most often, these meetings include 
4
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Hictions^but not 'jiireats^ of workplace closings, for example—to de-
terworkers from choosing union representation. Employers can fire 
workers for not attending the meetings. They can impose a "no ques-
tions or comments" rule at a captive-audience meeting and discipline 
any worker who speaks up. 
Case Study: Food Processing Workers in 
Wilson, North Carolina 
Smithfield Foods is the world's largest hog processing company. A 
Smithfield Foods plant in Wilson, North Carolina, employs some three 
hundred workers who produce bacon, sausages, hot dogs, and other re-
tail pork items. Workers here tried to form a union in early and mid-
1999, but they lost an NLRB election. Several workers detailed threats 
by Smithfield managers in captive-audience meetings to close the plant 
if workers voted in favor of collective bargaining.50 
Recounting management's captive-audience meetings with workers, 
shipping department employee Robert Atkinson said, "I saw about 
seven different videos on how the union just takes your dues, goes on 
strike, gets into fights and stuff. It really hurt us that the people only 
heard one side. It would be a lot fairer if the union could come in and 
talk to us. The company has a big advantage, making people come to 
meetings and showing videos. A lot of people don't come to union meet-
ings. They're scared the company will know."51 
"Predicting" Reprisals 
Under U.S. law, employers and antiunion consultants they routinely 
hire to oppose workers' organizing have refined methods of legally "pre-
dicting"—as distinct from unlawfully threatening—workplace clo-
sures, firings, wage and benefit cuts, and other dire consequences if 
workers form and join a trade union. A "prediction" that the workplace 
will be closed if employees vote for union representation is legal if the 
prediction is carefully phrased and based on objective facts rather than 
on the employer's subjective bias. 
This fine distinction in the law is not always apparent to workers or, 
indeed, to anyone seeking common-sense guidance on what is allowed 
or prohibited. Unfortunately for workers' rights, federal courts have 
& 
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tended to give wide leeway to employers to "predict" awful things if 
workers vote for a union. 
One prediction a court found to be "carefully phrased" was made by 
the owner of an Illinois restaurant where workers sought to form a union 
and bargain collectively. In a tape-recorded speech in a captive-audience 
meeting the owner stated, "If the union exists at [the company], [the 
company] will fail. The cancer will eat us up and we will fall by the way-
side . . . I am not making a threat. I am stating a fact. . . . I only know 
from my mind, from my pocketbook, how I stand on this." The NLRB 
found this statement unlawful. A federal appeals court reversed the 
board, finding the employer's statement a lawful prediction that did not 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right 
to freedom of association.52 
Case Study: Manufacturing Plant in Maryland 
In the mid-1990s, a new company called Precision Thermoforming and 
Packaging, Inc. (PTP), employed more than five hundred workers in a 
Baltimore, Maryland, factory. The workers packaged and shipped flash-
lights, batteries, and computer diskettes. PTP's wages were five dollars 
to seven dollars per hour. Health insurance cost employees thirty-six 
dollars per week from their paychecks—a benefit most of them de-
clined, since they made only $200-$280 per week. There was no pen-
sion plan. 
In mid-1995, a group of PTP workers began an effort to form and 
join a union. PTP management fired eight workers active in the union 
organizing effort. In addition to the firings, PTP managers and super-
visors: 
• threatened to close the plant if a majority of workers voted in favor 
of the union; 
• threatened to move work to Mexico; 
• threatened to fire workers who attended union meetings; 
• threatened to fire anyone who joined the union; 
• threatened to transfer workers to dirtier, lower-paying jobs if they 
supported the union; 
• told workers to report to management on the activities of union 
supporters; 
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• stationed managers and security guards with walkie-talkies to spy 
on union handbilling and report on workers who accepted flyers; 
• denied wage increases and promotions to workers who supported 
the union. 
"I'd say I was the one who got the union going," said Gilbert Gard-
ner, who began working at PTP in April 1993. "Then they fired me the 
day after I went to a hearing at the NLRB to set up the election," he 
told interviewers.53 Union supporters lost the NLRB election by a vote 
of 226-168. Before the vote, 60 percent of the workers signed cards au-
thorizing the union to represent them in collective bargaining. Man-
agement admitted committing the acts noted in the NLRB complaint 
and settled NLRB charges, but then declared bankruptcy and closed op-
erations. Victimized workers were still waiting for back pay payments 
five years later. 
Delays in NLRB and Court Procedures 
Delays in the U.S. labor law system arise first in the election procedure. 
NLRB elections take place at least several weeks after workers file a pe-
tition seeking an election. In many cases, employers can hold up the 
election for months by challenging the composition of the "appropriate 
bargaining unit." 
An employer can also file objections to an election after it takes place, 
arguing that the union used unfair tactics. It takes several months to re-
solve these objections. But even when the NLRB rules in workers' favor 
and orders the company to bargain with the union, the company can 
ignore the board's order. This forces workers and the NLRB to launch 
a new case on the refusal to bargain, often requiring years more to re-
solve in the courts. In many of the cases studied for this report, work-
ers voted in favor of union representation years ago, but they are still 
waiting for bargaining to begin while employers' appeals are tied up in 
court. 
Long delays also occur in unfair labor practice cases. Most cases in-
volve alleged discrimination against union supporters or refusals to bar-
gain in good faith. Several months pass before an administrative law 
judge hears the cases. Then several more months go by while the judge 
ponders a decision. The judge's decision can then be appealed to the 
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NLRB, where often two or three years go by before a decision is issued. 
The NLRB's decision can then be appealed to the federal courts, where 
again up to three years pass before a final decision is rendered. Many of 
the workers in cases studied here were fired many years earlier and have 
won reinstatement orders from administrative judges and the NLRB, 
but they still wait for clogged courts to rule on employers' appeals. 
Case Study: Shipyard in New Orleans, Louisiana 
With more than six thousand workers, Avondale Industries is Lou-
isiana's largest private-sector employer. The U.S. Navy is Avondale's 
biggest single customer, accounting for more than three-quarters of its 
business—$3 billion in Navy contract awards in the past decade. 
In 1993 Avondale workers launched an effort to form a union. Avon-
dale management unleashed a massive campaign against the workers' 
organizing effort. "They told us they'd shut the door if the union came 
in, that we'd lose Navy contracts," said sheet-metal worker Bruce Ligh-
tall, who has worked at the plant since 1979.54 The company also fired 
twenty-eight union activists. 
In a speech to assembled Avondale workers at a captive-audience 
meeting before the 1993 election, company president Albert L. Bossier, 
Jr., said, "If you really want to destroy Avondale, vote for the damn 
union. Those of you who don't want to destroy Avondale, you better 
make sure these whiners, malcontents, and slackers don't even come 
close to winning this election . . . Secure your future by rejecting this 
union and its bosses."55 
Despite management's threats and firings, the union won the elec-
tion by a vote of 1,950-1,632. Avondale management refused to accept 
the results and began a series of appeals to the NLRB. In April 1997— 
nearly four years after the election—the NLRB certified the results and 
ordered Avondale to bargain with the union. The company still refused, 
appealing the board's order to the federal courts. In 1999 a federal ap-
peals court overturned the election results because voter lists contained 
workers' first initials rather than their first names. No NLRB election 
had ever been overturned on such grounds before.56 
In a 1998 decision, a judge characterized Avondale's behavior as 
"egregious misconduct, demonstrating a general disregard for employ-
ees' fundamental rights." The judge ordered Avondale to reinstate fired 
Workers' Freedom of Association in the United States 39 
is issued, 
ts, where 
Many of 
and have 
eNLRB, 
Deals. 
> is Lou-
vondale's 
ters of its 
ide. 
»n. Avon-
workers' 
ion came 
ice Ligh-
also fired 
audience 
. Bossier, 
tie damn 
)u better 
en come 
:ting this 
the elec-
to accept 
1997— 
suits and 
refused, 
deral ap-
Dntained 
election 
lavior as 
employ-
:ate fired 
workers and to pledge not to repeat the unlawful conduct.57 Avondale 
did not comply with this order, and the case remained on appeal. 
Frank Johnson, an Avondale machinist with twenty-five years in the 
yard, said in 1999, "After the election I thought we'd sit down after a 
week or so and start bargaining. Now it's six years later, and we're still 
waiting."58 Echoing Johnson, Bruce Lightall said, "I thought we'd sit 
down after the election and negotiate a contract like reasonable people, 
to get some justice, respect, dignity. In time I found out how the law 
doesn't work for workers. It just helps the companies. They can appeal 
forever."59 
Surface Bargaining, Weak Remedies 
Even after workers form a union and bargaining begins, employers can 
continue to thwart workers' choice by bargaining in bad faith—going 
through the motions of meeting with the workers and making proposals 
and counterproposals without any intention of reaching an agreement. 
This tactic is called "surface bargaining." The problem is especially acute 
in newly organized workplaces where the employer has fiercely resisted 
workers' self-organization and resents their success. 
Case Study: Telecommunications Castings in 
Northbrook, Illinois 
Acme Die Casting, a division of Lovejoy Industries, makes a variety of 
small aluminum and zinc castings, mainly for the telecommunications 
industry. In October 1987, Acme employees voted 69-39 in favor of 
union representation. Jorge "Nico" Valenzuela became the head of the 
organizing committee and then the president of the shop union in 1987. 
"When we won the election we thought, 'Finally we can start making 
things better.' We elected a negotiating committee and asked manage-
ment to start bargaining," Valenzuela said.60 He and the other Acme 
workers did not know that years would go by before any bargaining 
would begin and that, when it did, bargaining would be futile. 
After the election, the company filed objections to the election so un-
founded that the NLRB dismissed them without a hearing. But Acme 
refused to accept the decision, forcing the union to file refusal-to-bar-
gain charges and a new round of labor board and court proceedings. 
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In an April 1993 decision, a judge ordered Acme to "cease and de-
sist" from refusing to bargain and to return to the table and bargain in 
good faith. The judge ruled that the company's violations "are repeated 
and pervasive and evidence on its part an attitude of total disregard for 
its statutory obligations."61 
Acme management shifted to a strategy of appearing to bargain by 
making proposals and counterproposals to the workers on minor sub-
jects. However, the company "made demands they knew would be sui-
cidal for the union" in other areas, said union representative Terry Davis. 
The company proposed tiny wage increases and demanded enormous 
hikes in employee payments for health insurance that would far exceed 
any pay increase.62 A carefully coached employer can nearly always 
frame such demands as "hard bargaining," which is legal, as long as it 
makes proposals and counterproposals in other areas. 
Bargaining went nowhere for six years. In March 1999, the union 
sent a letter to Acme and to the NLRB disclaiming representation rights. 
"At this rate," said union negotiator Davis, "the company would still 
have deal-killers on the table twenty-five years from now."63 
A top Acme official conceded, "We worked long and hard for years 
to convince our employees that they're better off with us than with a 
union. The union did nothing but lie about us. People now believe 
they're better off with us than with a union."64 
These were years when, under the law, the company was supposed to 
be bargaining in good faith with the workers with a sincere desire to 
reach an agreement. The manager's statement shows how far from sin-
cere the company's bargaining was. Yet in the end, its methods prevailed 
against workers' right to bargain collectively, and the legal structure sup-
posed to protect workers' rights proved no impediment to these tactics. 
Exclusion of Millions of Workers from Protection 
of Organizing and Bargaining Rights 
International norms refer to the right of "every person" to form and join 
trade unions and to bargain collectively. Several of the cases examined 
for this report involved workers excluded from coverage by the NLRA, 
such as agricultural workers, domestic employees, and "independent" 
contractors who actually work in a dependent relationship with a single 
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employer for years. Low-level supervisors and managers are also ex-
cluded from legal protection. 
In all, millions of workers in the United States are excluded from cov-
erage of laws that are supposed to protect the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. Workers who fall under these exclusions can be 
summarily fired with impunity for seeking to form and join a union. 
Even where the employer does not fire them, workers' requests to bar-
gain collectively can be ignored. 
Case Study: Household Domestic Workers 
More than 800,000 officially reported "private household workers" held 
jobs as domestic employees in 1998. Nearly 30 percent were foreign 
migrant workers, and the vast majority were women.65 Officials of 
multinational corporations, international organizations, and other elites 
residing in the United States have brought thousands of domestic work-
ers into the United States. 
An employer from Hilda Dos Santos's native Brazil held her as a "live-
in slave" for nearly twenty years in a suburb of Washington, D.C. She 
was never paid a salary, was physically assaulted, and was denied med-
ical care for a stomach tumor the size of a soccer ball. Her plight only 
came to light when neighbors acted at the sight of her tumor and re-
sulting publicity led to a successful prosecution.66 Dos Santos's case il-
lustrates the difficulty of uncovering such abuses. After twenty years of 
servitude, she was granted temporary legal status to testify against her 
employer but was then subject to deportation. An unknown number of 
similar victims remain silent because exposure would mean deportation 
for them, too. 
Whether or not they are enforced, minimum wage laws, overtime 
laws, and child labor laws apply to most domestic workers in the United 
States. But if they attempt to form and join a union, or exercise any free-
dom of association even without the intent of forming a union, they 
can be threatened, intimidated, or fired by their employer because of 
their exclusion from coverage by the NLRA. The same abuses affect 
agricultural workers, low-level supervisors, and so-called independent 
contractors who are really dependent on a single employer for their 
livelihoods. 
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Subcontracted and Temporary Workers 
Are Denied Freedom of Association 
and Effective Remedies 
Many employers can use subcontracting arrangements and temporary 
employment agencies to avoid any obligation to recognize workers' 
rights of organization and collective bargaining. This problem afflicts 
workers in the apparel manufacturing industry, in janitorial services, in 
high-technology computer services, and other sectors characterized by 
layers of subcontracting arrangements. Prime contractors often simply 
cancel the contracts of subcontractors whose employees form and join 
unions. The result is widespread denial of workers' freedom of associa-
tion. 
avc 
Case Study: High-Tech Computer Programmers 
in Seattle, Washington 
The dilemma regarding freedom of association is stark for workers at 
temporary employment agencies, even at the high end of the economic 
ladder. A recent example of temporary agency workers' dilemma is 
found at the cutting edge of the new economy. More than twenty thou-
sand workers are employed at Microsoft's Redmond, Washington, cam-
pus and other facilities in the Seattle area. But six thousand of them are 
not employed by Microsoft. Instead, they are employed by many tem-
porary agencies supplying high-tech workers to Microsoft and other 
area companies. Many have worked for several years at Microsoft. They 
have come to be known as "perma-temps." Often they work side-by-
side in teams with regular, full-time employees. 
Some Microsoft perma-temps formed the Washington Alliance of 
Technology Workers (WashTech) in early 1998. But WashTech has a 
Catch-22-type problem. By defining perma-temps as contractors em-
ployed by various temporary agencies, Microsoft avoids being their em-
ployer for purposes of the NLRA's protection of the right to organize. 
Meanwhile, the agencies tell temps that in order to form a union that 
agency management will deal with, they have to organize other em-
ployees of the agency, not just those working at Microsoft. 
"First we asked our Microsoft managers to bargain with us," said 
perma-temp Barbara Judd, describing an effort by her and a group of 
Ca 
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co-workers to be recognized by Microsoft.67 Management refused. Re-
sponding to press inquiries, a spokesman for Microsoft said, "bargain-
ing units are a matter between employers and employees and Microsoft 
is not the employer of the workers."68 
Attempts to be recognized by the temp agencies were equally un-
availing. "c We don't have to talk to you, and we won't' is what they told 
us," said Judd. "They told us we had to get all the temps that worked at 
other companies besides Microsoft. We had no way to know who they 
were or how to reach them. Besides, they had nothing to do with our 
problems at Microsoft."69 
Barbara Judd s perma-temp post at Microsoft ended in March 2000 
when the company announced it was abandoning the tax preparation 
software project that she and her co-workers developed.70 "We received 
two days notice" of being laid off, Judd said. Some workers moved to 
another tax preparation software company, but Judd decided to look for 
full-time employment. "I don't want to be a part of that system," she 
said. "Workers who take temp jobs do not realize there is a larger im-
pact than just the absence of benefits. You essentially lose the ability to 
organize . . . the legal system is just not set up to deal with these long-
term temp issues "71 
Case Study: Sweatshop in New York City 
Under current U.S. labor law, retailers and manufacturers who profit 
from sweatshops' race to the bottom on labor standards are not held 
responsible for labor law violations committed by contractors or sub-
contractors, including violations of workers' organizing rights. United 
States Labor Department studies in 1997 and 1998 indicated that 
nearly two-thirds of garment industry shops in New York violated min-
imum wage and overtime laws.72 A comprehensive study of the Los An-
geles garment industry concluded in 1999 that "this important industry 
is plagued by substandard working conditions. . . . There is widespread 
non-compliance with labor, health, and safety laws."73 
In 1997, a group of workers at a midtown Manhattan sewing shop 
called MK Collections formed a union. Mario Ramirez said that work-
ers took action because they had not been paid for two months and "be-
cause the owners screamed at people."74 Eduardo Rodriguez, who like 
Ramirez came to New York from Puebla, Mexico, was another union 
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adherent. "We would talk outside before work and at lunchtime, but 
never in big groups," he explained. Rodriguez estimated union support 
at about forty workers, a majority of the sixty-five to seventy people 
working at MK Collections. 
In January 1997, MK workers brought their organizing effort to a 
head with a work stoppage demanding back pay for work performed. 
At first, their movement bore fruit. Seven members of the organizing 
group signed a handwritten agreement with the owner recognizing the 
workers' union, setting a just cause standard for disciplinary action, 
promising to maintain clean bathrooms, and—besides paying wages 
on time—to pay an additional fifty per week until full back pay was 
reached for each worker. 
The agreement held up for only four months. The employer fired two 
committee members who did not want to protest because of immigra-
tion fears. In early May 1997, the company closed, claiming that a man-
ufacturer had canceled a production contract. According to Ramirez 
and Rodriguez, the owner reopened at a new location and hired a new 
work force just a few days later. 
Their experience left a mark on Ramirez and Rodriguez. "I've 
thought about organizing in my new job," said Ramirez, who found 
other work in the garment industry. "But I need to be guaranteed that 
I won't be fired." Rodriguez, who took a new job in a restaurant, said, 
"As long as there is no law to protect us better, I don't think it is likely 
that I will organize again." 
Nullification of the Right to Strike by the 
Permanent-Replacement Doctrine 
Under U.S. labor law, employers can hire new employees to perma-
nently replace workers who exercise the right to strike. This doctrine 
runs counter to international standards recognizing the right to strike 
as an essential element of freedom of association. Considering the U.S. 
striker replacement rule, the ILO s Committee on Freedom of Associa-
tion determined that the right to strike "is not really guaranteed when 
a worker who exercises it legally runs the risk of seeing his or her job 
taken up permanently by another worker, just as legally" and that per-
manent replacement "entails a risk of derogation from the right to strike 
which may affect the free exercise of trade union rights."75 
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Case Study: Steelworkers in Pueblo, Colorado 
Oregon Steel Company permanently replaced more than a thousand 
workers who exercised the right to strike at its Pueblo, Colorado, steel 
mill in October 1997. Many of the replacements came from outside 
the Pueblo area, drawn by the company's newspaper advertisements 
throughout Colorado and neighboring states offering wages of thirteen 
dollars to nineteen dollars per hour for permanent replacements. A com-
pany notice declared, "It is the intent of the Company for every re-
placement worker hired to mean one less job for the strikers at the 
conclusion of the strike."76 
On December 30, 1997, three months after it began, Oregon Steel 
workers ended their strike and offered unconditionally to return to work. 
The company refused to take them back except when vacancies occur af-
ter a replacement worker leaves. Some workers returned under this legal 
requirement, but most of the Oregon Steel workers were still out of work 
in 2000 because the company permanendy replaced them with new hires. 
According to a judge who held an eight-month-long hearing on the 
case, the company was guilty of interference, coercion, discrimination, 
and bad-faith bargaining.77 Oregon Steel management's unfair labor 
practices before the strike began included: 
• spying on a union meeting where bargaining strategies were 
discussed; 
• threatening to close the plant and "reopen non-union in thirty 
days" if workers struck; 
• assigning undesirable, dirty jobs cleaning arc furnaces and cooling 
towers to union supporters because of their support for the union; 
• threatening to "bust" the union if workers struck (as one witness 
testified, a supervisor said, "within 15 minutes they would have two 
bus loads of people in the mill to do our jobs and the union would no 
longer exist"); 
• promising promotions to workers if they would cross the picket 
lines and return to work during a strike. 
In all, said the judge, Oregon Steel's unfair labor practices "were sub-
stantial and antithetical to good faith bargaining." Under this ruling, 
workers are entitled to reinstatement because a company that violates 
the law loses the right to permanently replace strikers. However, the 
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company appealed the decision and vowed to keep appealing for years 
before a final decision is obtained in the case. In the meantime, the 
workers remain replaced and without their means of livelihood for 
themselves and their families. 
Special Vulnerability of Immigrant Workers 
International human rights principles apply to all persons regardless of 
immigration and citizenship status. In the United States, workers' rights 
violations with particular characteristics affect immigrant workers in 
nearly every economic sector and geographic area examined in this re-
port. For many, the vulnerability of their undocumented status and re-
lated fear of deportation are the most powerful forces inhibiting their 
exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
During NLRB election campaigns, employers commonly threaten to 
call the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to have workers de-
ported. Immigrant workers are often afraid to come forward to file unfair 
labor practice charges or to appear as witnesses in unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings because they fear their immigration status will be challenged. 
Case Study: Warehouse Workers in the 
Washington Apple Industry 
Thousands of workers are employed in the warehouse sector of the 
Washington apple industry. Like apple pickers, many seasonal workers 
in the warehouses are migrants from Mexico. 
Apple warehouse workers are not defined as agricultural workers. 
They are covered by the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice 
to threaten, coerce, or discriminate against workers for union organiz-
ing activity. But when workers at one of the largest apple processing 
companies sought to form and join a union in 1997 and 1998, man-
agement responded with dismissals of key union leaders and threats that 
the INS would deport workers if they formed a union.78 Here is how 
one worker described the company's tactics: 
At the meetings they talked the most about the INS. . . . [T]he com-
pany keeps talking about INS because they know a lot of workers on 
the night shift are undocumented—I would guess at least half.... It is 
only now that we have started organizing that they have started looking 
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for problems with people's papers. And it is only now that they have 
started threatening us with INS raids. . . . They know that we are afraid 
to even talk about this because we don't want to risk ourselves or anyone 
else losing their jobs or being deported, so it is a very powerful threat.79 
The union lost the NLRB election even though a majority of work-
ers had signed cards to join the union and authorize the union to bar-
gain on their behalf. 
Even Legal Immigrants Unprotected 
About thirty thousand temporary agricultural workers enter the United 
States each year under a special program called H-2A giving them legal 
authorization to work in areas where employers claim a shortage of do-
mestic workers. H-2A workers have a special status among migrant farm 
workers. They come to the United States openly and legally. They are 
covered by wage laws, workers' compensation, and other standards. 
But valid papers are no guarantee of protection for H-2A workers' 
freedom of association. As agricultural workers, they are not covered by 
the NLRA's antidiscrimination provision meant to protect the right to 
organize. 
H-2A workers are tied to the growers who contract for their labor. 
They have no opportunity to organize for improved conditions and no 
opportunity to change employers to obtain better conditions. If they try 
to form and join a union, the grower for whom they work can cancel 
their work contract and have them deported. 
Case Study: H-2A Workers in North Carolina 
More than ten thousand migrant workers with H-2A visas went to 
North Carolina in 1999, making growers there the leading employers 
of H-2A workers in the United States.80 North Carolina's H-2A work-
ers are mostly Mexican, single young men, who harvest tobacco, sweet 
potatoes, cucumbers, bell peppers, apples, peaches, melons, and various 
other seasonal crops from April until November.81 
At home "there's no work," which workers described as their main 
reason for emigrating.82 Many of the workers come from rural villages 
in Mexico. Some spoke Spanish with difficulty, as in their village at 
home people mainly speak Misteco, a local Indian language. In most 
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cases earnings in U.S. dollars from their H-2A employment are the only 
source of income for their families and for their communities. 
There is evidence of a campaign of intimidation from the time H-2A 
workers first enter the United States to discourage any exercise of free-
dom of association. Legal Services attorneys and union organizers are 
"the enemy," they are told by growers' officials. Most pointedly, officials 
lead workers through a ritual akin to book-burning by making them col-
lectively trash "Know Your Rights" manuals from Legal Services attor-
neys and take instead employee handbooks issued by growers.83 
On paper, H-2A workers can seek help from Legal Services and file 
legal claims for violations of H-2A program requirements (but not for 
violation of the right to form and join trade unions, since they are ex-
cluded from NLRA protection). However, in this atmosphere of grower 
hostility to Legal Services, farm workers are reluctant to pursue legal 
claims that they may have against growers. "They don't let us talk to Le-
gal Services or the union," one worker said. "They would fire us if we 
called them or talked to them."84 
In December 1997, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) re-
ported that "H-2A workers . . . are unlikely to complain about worker 
protection violations fearing they will lose their jobs or will not be hired 
in the future."85 The fear of blacklisting is well founded, according to a 
1999 Carnegie Endowment study, which based its findings on inter-
views conducted in Mexico with current Mexican H-2A workers. The 
Carnegie study found that "blacklisting of H-2A workers appears to be 
widespread, is highly organized, and occurs at all stages of the recruit-
ment and employment process. Workers report that the period of black-
listing now lasts three years, up from one year earlier in the decade."86 
Recommendations 
Here is a summary of recommended changes in U.S. labor law to ad-
dress the problems cited above: 
Interim Reinstatement and Tougher Remedies 
A worker who is fired for union activity should be reinstated immedi-
ately while the case continues to be litigated. Only such an interim re-
instatement remedy can overcome the devastating impact on individual 
workers who are dismissed and on the workers' overall organizing effort. 
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Remedies and sanctions should have a deterrent effect. Workers 
should receive full back pay regardless of interim earnings. They should 
receive punitive damages in cases of willful violations. In addition to 
paying workers victimized by violations, employers who repeatedly en-
gage in discrimination against union supporters should pay substantial 
fines to the NLRB. 
Equal Access to the Workplace, Faster Elections, 
"Card-Check" Certification 
A principle of equal access should apply where employers force workers 
into captive audience meetings at the workplace. Workers should have 
access to information from union representatives in the workplace about 
their right to form and join trade unions and to bargain collectively. The 
NLRB should conduct an election as quickly as possible after the filing 
of a petition, normally within a matter of days. Experience demonstrates 
that where workers and employers can agree to use card checks—neu-
tral verification that workers freely signed cards authorizing represen-
tation and collective bargaining—they can combine the benefits of 
freedom of choice and a mutually respectful relationship that carries 
over into collective bargaining. Public policy should encourage the use 
of voluntary card-check agreements as an alternative means of estab-
lishing workers' majority sentiment and collective bargaining rights. 
Tighter Scrutiny and Tougher Remedies 
The NLRB should more closely scrutinize employers' antiunion state-
ments for potentially coercive effect, removing the artificial distinction 
between "predictions" and "threats." Where it finds violations, the 
board should apply strong, swift remedies like additional union access 
to the workplace or bargaining orders where employers' conduct makes 
fair elections impossible. 
Legal Responsibility of the Dominant 
Economic Force 
Labor law must change to encompass the rights and interests of con-
tingent workers, contract workers, and others involved in new occupa-
tions and industries. Congress should enact legislation cutting through 
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the fiction of subcontracted employment relationships that are struc-
tured to avoid responsibility for recognizing workers' rights. 
Fixing responsibility should be based on a test of effective economic 
power to set workers' terms and conditions of employment, not on the 
formality of an employment relationship. The dominant economic en-
tity in the employment relationship holding real power over workers' 
terms and conditions of employment should have legal responsibility to 
bargain with workers when a majority choose representation. 
Stronger Remedies for Surface Bargaining 
Stronger remedies should be fashioned for willful refusal to bargain in 
good faith. For example, where workers have formed and joined a new 
union in a previously unorganized workplace and the employer is found 
to bargain in bad faith, workers should have recourse to first-contract 
arbitration as a remedy, where an independent arbitrator sets contract 
terms. 
Arbitration for a first contract gives workers an opportunity to es-
tablish a bargaining relationship that would most likely have taken 
shape had the employer bargained in good faith. It also provides a 
chance to demonstrate to the employer that both parties can act re-
sponsibly under a collective agreement, making good-faith negotiations 
more probable in subsequent bargaining. 
Eliminate Statutory Exclusions, Protect All 
Workers' Organizing Rights 
Congress should bring agricultural workers, domestic workers, and low-
level supervisors under NLRA coverage with the same rights and pro-
tections as all other covered workers. Legal reform should also subject 
employers' claims of workers' "independent contractor" status to strict 
scrutiny under standards that make the workers' real-life dependence on 
employers—not how employers classify them—the test for NLRA cov-
erage. 
In general, workers who want to organize and bargain collectively 
should have the right to organize and bargain collectively, except where 
there are manifestly no employers to bargain with or where the essence 
of such workers' jobs is so truly managerial or supervisory that they ef-
fectively would be bargaining with themselves. 
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Reverse the Permanent-Replacement Doctrine 
Congress should enact legislation prohibiting the permanent replace-
ment of workers who exercise the right to strike. The balance should be 
restored to a genuine equilibrium in which temporary replacements give 
way to employee strikers when the strike ends. In effect, prohibiting per-
manent striker replacements effectuates a "balance of pain" in a strike 
that promotes more rapid resolution of a dispute while respecting both 
workers' right to strike and managements continued operations. 
More Protection for Immigrant Workers, 
Stronger Remedies 
Congress should establish a new visa category for undocumented work-
ers who suffer violations of their right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, and the INS should exercise discretionary authority to allow them 
to remain in the United States. Workers who obtain a reinstatement or-
der because their right to freedom of association was violated should be 
immediately reinstated and granted a work authorization card for suffi-
cient time to allow them to seek renewed, extended, or permanent au-
thorization under discretionary authority in such cases. 
Mobility and Organizing Rights for H-2A Workers 
The H-2A program should allow workers to seek work with a different 
employer if their employer violates their rights. Where workers are dis-
missed or discriminated against for exercising rights of association, a 
strengthened regime is needed to ensure swift reinstatement or place-
ment with another employer who will respect their rights. 
Labor Department regulations governing the H-2A program should 
halt H-2A recruiters' characterizations of unions and legal services as 
"enemies" of H-2A workers. The H-2A program should instead require 
that workers be fully informed of their rights to organize and bargain 
collectively and have access to legal services and to the justice system, as 
they desire. 
Conclusion 
Both historical experience and a review of current conditions around 
the world indicate that strong, independent, democratic trade unions 
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are vital for societies where human rights are respected. Human rights 
cannot flourish where workers' rights are not enforced. This is as true 
for the United States as for any other country. 
Labor rights violations in the United States are especially troubling 
when the U.S. administration is pressing other countries to ensure re-
spect for internationally recognized workers' rights as part of the global 
trade and investment system—at the World Trade Organization, for ex-
ample, or in the new Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. United 
States insistence on a rights-based linkage to trade is undercut when core 
labor rights are systematically violated in the United States. 
Without diminishing the seriousness of workers' rights violations in 
the United States, a balanced perspective must be maintained. United 
States workers generally do not confront gross human rights violations 
where death squads assassinate trade union organizers or collective bar-
gaining and strikes are outlawed. But the absence of systematic govern-
ment repression does not mean that workers in the United States have 
effective exercise of the right to freedom of association. On the contrary, 
workers' freedom of association is under sustained attack in the United 
States, and the government is failing its responsibility under interna-
tional human rights standards to deter such attacks and protect work-
ers' rights. 
So long as worker organizing, collective bargaining, and the right to 
strike are seen only as economic disputes involving the exercise of power 
in pursuit of higher wages for employees or higher profits for employ-
ers, change in U.S. labor law and practice is unlikely. Reformulating 
these activities as human rights that must be respected under interna-
tional law can begin a process of change. 
What is most needed is a new spirit of commitment by the labor law 
community and the government to give effect to both international hu-
man rights norms and the still-vital affirmation in the United States' 
own basic labor law of full freedom of association for workers. A way to 
begin fostering such a change of spirit is for the United States to ratify 
ILO conventions 87 and 98. This will send a strong signal to workers, 
employers, labor law authorities, and to the international community 
that the United States is serious about holding itself to international hu-
man rights and labor rights standards as it presses for the inclusion of 
such standards in new global and regional trade arrangements. 
